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Abstract 
Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis (IDPSA) is conceived as a way to analyze the 
evolution of accident scenarios in complex dynamic systems, like nuclear, aerospace and process 
ones, accounting for the mutual interactions between the failure and recovery of system 
components, the evolving physical processes, the control and operator actions, the software and 
firmware. 
In spite of the potential offered by IDPSA, several challenges need to be effectively addressed for its 
development and practical deployment. In this paper, we give an overview of these and discuss the 
related implications in terms of research perspectives. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the Strategic Research Agenda (SRA)of the Sustainable Nuclear Technology Platform (SNETP) of the 
European Union, issued in May 2009,significant relevance is given to the safety of current and future 
Light Water Reactors (http://www.snetp.eu/www/snetp/images/stories/Docs-
AboutSNETP/sra2009.pdf). Traditionally, regulation of design and operation of nuclear power plants 
have been based on deterministic analysis methods to verify criteria that  assure plant safety in a 
number of postulated design basis accident scenarios. These criteria also allow identifying which 
plant Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) and activities are important to safety. Design, 
operation and maintenance of these "safety-related" SSC and activities are controlled through 
regulatory requirements.  
However, compliance with the evolving regulatory requirements is anticipated to require innovative 
deterministic and probabilistic approaches of safety assessment for the existing nuclear power 
plants. In this respect, a related medium-term challenge explicitly mentioned in the SRA is to 
combine the use of deterministic and probabilistic methodologies for safety assessment. 
The motivation for this comes from the realization that the static logic models (typically, event trees 
(ET) and fault trees (FT)) used in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) have limitations in the 
modeling and treatment of the time-dependent interactions that shape dynamic accident scenarios, 
involving the failure and recovery processes of the system components, the physical 
processesevolving in the system, the control and operator actions, the software and firmware.  
For example, in systems with multiple top events (TE), the actual final state of a dynamic scenario 
depends on the order, timing and magnitude of the component failure events (Aldemir, 1989; Hassan 
and Aldemir, 1990; Kirschenbaum et al., 2009; Zio and Di Maio, 2009; Zio et al., 2010); the static 
ET/FT approach, where the order of events is pre-set by the analyst, is not capable of capturing this 
and may fail to analyze vulnerable sequences which would, then, remain uncovered. 
Accounting for dynamic process failures in digital instrumentation and control (I&C), and passive 
systems also poses a challenge to the static ET/FT analysis approach because failure can occurdue to 
the uncertain process behavior, even if no system components fail. 
Finally, the impact of human operator actions along an accident sequence is also difficult to model 
with the traditional ET/FT approach to safety analysis. 
In this context, the presentpaper tries toposition the concept of Integrated Deterministic and 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) and discussesthe challenges for its development and 
deployment in practice. 
In the following Section, we give a very brief overview of the methods for IDPSA. In Section 3, we list 
and discuss some of the main challenges for the use of these methods. In Section 4, we conclude 
with some comments on these challenges from a research perspective.   
 
2. IDPSA Methodologies 
IDPSA comprises a set of methods which use tightly coupled probabilistic and deterministic 
approaches to address aleatory (stochastic aspects of accident scenarios) and epistemic (model and 
parameters) uncertainties in a consistent manner (Aldemir, 2013).  
A number of methodologies have been developedfor combining probabilistic and deterministic 
approaches to safety analysis in order to account for the time-dependentcharacter of the events 
which define accident progression.In these methodologies, the sequencing of events is not 
predetermined by the analyst (as it is the case with the traditional PSA modelling by ET/FT) but rather 
it emerges from the solution of the system model (usually simulated via a computer code) as the 
system evolves in time.   
In the report (NUREG/CR-6901, 2006), a number of dynamic methodologies for probabilistic safety 
analysis are reviewed with regard to their applicabilityfor modeling digital systems in nuclear power 
plant PSA. Methodologiesincluded in the analyses are Markov modeling, dynamic flowgraph 
modeling and Petri net approaches. The reportalso points out the issues that need to be addressed, 
in both modeling the reliability of digital I&Csystems and incorporating digital I&C system reliability 
models into existing PSA models todetermine the overall plant response. Preliminaryacceptance 
criteria for digital system models prior to their implementationin regulatory applications are also 
introduced. 
In the follow-up reports NUREG/CR-6942 and 6985, a benchmark Digital Feedwater ControlSystem 
(DFWCS) is specified and two dynamic methodologies, namely dynamic flowgraph methodology 
(DFM,NUREG/CR-6465; NUREG/CR-6710) and the Markov/Cell-to-cell mapping technique (CCMT, 
Tombuyes and Aldemir, 1996 and 1997), are implemented todemonstrate how an existing nuclear 
power plant PSA canincorporate a digital upgrade of the instrumentation and control system. The 
results obtainedfrom the DFM and Markov/CCMT models of the DFWCS failure modes are compared, 
and theimpact of scenarios directly related to the hypothetical digital upgrade on the core 
damagefrequency (CDF) is assessed on a demonstrative basis. The study showsthat a DFWCS similar 
to that of an operating plant can be modeled using dynamicmethodologies and that the results can 
be incorporated into an existing PSA to quantify theimpact of a digital upgrade on the plant CDF. 
Similarly, in the project Approdyn (final report in French downloadable athttp://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/74/01/81/PDF/Rapport_final_APPRODYN_v7a_NB.pdf, in French) different 
methods have been considered, including Stochastic and Synchronized Petri Nets, Stochastic Hybrid 
Automata and Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes, for the analysis of a 900 MW Heat 
Exchanger with Steam Generator model provided by Electricite’ de France (EDF). 
A recent review of methodologies for IDPSA can be found in (Aldemir 2013), where they are 
categorized as: continuous-time, discrete-time and hybrid, i.e. considering both continuous and 
discrete times. The constitutive ingredients of all these methodologies are a time-dependent, 
physical model of the system dynamics, a list of identified, possible normal and abnormal system 
configurations and a model of the stochastic process of system transport in time from one state to 
another. Some methodologies have also graphical interfaces, an aspect which is regarded important 
for rendering feasible their use in practical applications. 
Comprehensive continuous-time methodsinclude: 
 the continuous event tree (CET) approach (Devooghtand Smidts, 1992a,b; Smidts and 
Devooght, 1992; Smidts, 1992), in which an integral equation is formulated to describe the 
system transport process in time accounting for dependencies amongfailure events due to 
process/hardware/software/firmware/humaninteractions; the problem is generally solved 
usingMonte Carlo simulation.  
 The CCMT mentioned above, which defines the system states in terms of both system 
configurations (i.e., the vectors of the discrete states occupied by the components) and 
(user-specified) intervals (cells) “occupied” by the physical process variables. This allows 
modelling system configuration (instantaneous) changes upon crossings of threshold values 
(e.g. a valve opening when the pressure variable exceeds a given value). A continuous time 
Markov model describes the time-evolution of the probability of occupying the system 
states, in which the state transition rates are obtained from the system model and the 
Chapman–Kolmogorov equation; the problem can be solved using standard ordinary 
differential equation solvers. 
 The stimulus-driven theory of probabilistic dynamics (Labeau and Izquierdo, 2005), which is 
capable of overcoming the limitation of the assumption of instantaneous changes in the 
system dynamics when a threshold is overcome or stimuli conditions prompt action for a 
change in the system (e.g. an operator action): changes may take some time to occur, and 
both the delay and the stimuli could be stochastic variables; the integral equation describing 
the process is solved by Monte Carlo methods. 
 
Continuous-time methods are computationally intensive and the models and algorithms must be 
developed specificto the system under consideration: for these reasons, application has been 
limited. 
Discrete-time methods are based on Monte Carlo simulation of the branching of scenarios (changes 
in system configuration) at the discrete times of occurrence of the stochastic events (e.g. component 
failures), followed by the deterministic simulation of the system process evolution by a physical 
model. For reducing the computational burden, biasing techniques to accelerate the stochastic 
simulation and meta-models (e.g. neural networks) to accelerate the deterministic simulation of the 
system process can be introduced. Examples are given in (Marseguerra et al., 1994; Marseguerra et 
al., 1995; Marseguerra and Zio, 1995, 1996, 1998; Labeau, 1996, 2006; Zio, 1995). For practical 
applications, the most promising discrete-time method is that of dynamic event trees (DET), which 
are ET whose scenario branching is not preset by the analyst: both the timing and sequence of the 
events occurring in a scenario are simulated from a time-dependentmodel of the system evolution 
with given branching conditions, which leads to amore comprehensive and systematic coverage of 
the space of possible event sequencesthan the traditional ET/FT approach. DET-based methods are 
DYLAM (Dynamical Logical Methodology) (Amendola and Reina,1984; Cacciabue et al., 1986; Cojazzi, 
1996), DETAM (Dynamic EventTree Analysis Method) (Deoss and Siu, 1989), DDET (Dynamic 
DiscreteEvent Tree) (Acosta and Siu, 1993) method, ADS (AccidentDynamic Simulator) (Kae-Sheng 
and Mosleh, 1996), ISA (Integrated Safety Assessment)methodology (Izquerdo et al., 1994) , 
ADAPTapproach (Hakobyan et al., 2008; Catalyurek et al., 2010), MCDET whichuses both DETs and 
MC simulation (Marchand et al., 1998; Hoferet al., 2002; Hofer et al., 2004), GA-DPRA (Voroyev and 
Kudinov, 2011) which enables an intelligent andadaptive exploration of the scenario space. These 
methods differ in the way that branching is performed and controlled, in the different dynamic 
aspects modeled (including human interventions, passive systems, controls) and in the treatment of 
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. These methods have been developed into software for nuclear 
application, with limitations coming from the computational burden and the processing of the large 
amount of data generated. 
As previously mentioned, there are also methods with graphical interfaces, like Petri nets (Dutuitet 
al., 1997; Gribaudo et al., 2006), dynamic flowgraphs (Guarroet al., 1996; Yau, 1997), dynamic fault-
trees (Andrews and Dugan,1999; Cepin and Mavko, 2001), the event-sequence diagram 
(ESD)approach (Swaminathan and Smidts, 1999), and the GO-FLOWmethodology (Matsuoka and 
Kobayashi, 1988, 1991). 
 
3. Challenges for IDPSA methodologies 
IDPSA is not intended to be used in replacement of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and 
Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) approaches; rather, IDPSA is to be considered a way to: 
 Explicitly account for time-dependent interactions between physical phenomena, 
equipment failures, safety and non-safety systems interactions, control logic, 
operator actions. 
 Reduce expert judgment and simplifying assumptions about the above mentioned 
time-dependencies and the related scenarios structuring. 
 Identify and characterize undiscovered plant vulnerabilities, i.e. a-priori unknown 
vulnerable scenarios (Figure 1). 
 Treatdifferent sources of uncertainties, both aleatory and epistemic, in a coherent 
framework, for realistic quantification of safety margins with associated uncertainty 
estimation. IDPSA is expected to provide additional help to PSA and DSA practitioners 
and experts, by reducing and quantifying uncertainties in a consistent and resource- 
and time-efficient manner, as well as assuring proper coverage of the uncertainty 
space. 
Figure 1 below abstractly sketches the contribution of IDPSA in identifying vulnerable scenarios. 
Given the unknown risk profile which the plant is subject to, risk analysis is used to estimate it and 
risk management to eventually envelope it with safety margins for protecting from the unknowns. 
Deterministic safety analysis (DSA) does so by considering conservative design basis accidents within 
a precautionary principle viewpoint against the potential threats; PSA attempts to more realistically 
follow the true risk profile, e.g. by an analytical ET/FT approach to identify minimal cut sets and 
accident scenarios. The integration of DSA and PSA enlarges the exploration of the possible plant 
scenarios by giving due account to time-dependencies in their development and the consistent 
treatment of uncertainties, with the possibility of uncovering unknown vulnerable scenarios. 
 
Figure 1: Representative sketch of the identification of undiscovered plant vulnerabilities by IDPSA = 
DSA (Deterministic Safety Analysis) + PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis). Prime implicants are the 
extension of minimal cut sets which enable to account for the timing and sequencing of events 
occurrence; they are defined as event product terms (intersection of events) that render true the 
structure function and that cannot be covered by more generalimplicants, i.e., they cannot contain 
any shorter intersection of events that can render true the system structure function (Quine, 1952). 
The benefits expected from IDPSA come at the price of new issues and challenges. While IDPSA, in 
principle, enlarges the exploration of the possible scenario space by avoiding to pre-set the ordering 
of events and including the time-dependencies interactions of all elements in the systems, its degree 
of completeness still depends on the plant basic event space, whose definition partly comes from 
PSA/DSA studies but a consistent way must be defined. This is complicated by the current situation 
of:   
- Non-transparency of complex PSA models aiming at a realistic representation of complex 
system designs, when attempting at resolving time-dependent interactions between physical 
phenomena, control logic, operator actions, software/firmware and equipment failures. 
- Increased complexity of the thermal-hydraulic (TH) models for DSA, with prohibitive 
computational costs for running hundreds/thousands of transients simulations with Best-
Estimate (BE) deterministic codes. 
- Difficult quantification of the uncertainties associated to the TH modelsadopted for accident 
analysis in DSA. 
- Increased complexity in the assessment of the impact of human operator actions on time- 
dependent scenarios. 
While IDPSA is recognized to potentially complement traditional DSA and PSA with an improved 
coverage of the uncertain risk profile and increased capabilities of modelling 
hardware/software/process/human interactions during scenario evolution, in practice it is important 
that this can be achieved in consistency with the existing methods and tools of DSA and PSA to which 
they should “add-on” and not “replace”. This is a most critical aspect for deployment to industry, and 
includes the need for flexible computational platforms allowing for linking of different codes, with 
their input-output requirements and structures. 
From the computational point of view, the burden of scenario generation is dramatically increased in 
IDPSA. To reduce computational burden,developments are undergoing for: 
 Efficient parallel processing of scenarios (Catalyurek et al., 2010). 
 Early pruning of branches in the dynamic event trees, e.g. based on their probability (Cojazzi, 
1996) or on their similarity with scenarios of no interest for the analysis (the non-failure 
scenarios) (Zamalieva et al., 2013). 
 Use of advanced Monte Carlo simulation methods (i.e. Line Sampling and Subset Sampling) 
and meta-models (i.e., Neural Networks, Support Vector Machines, Local Gaussian 
Processes) mimicking best-estimate (BE) codes, to efficiently simulate the large number of 
accidental sequences necessary, to cover the long periods of time required by the analysis 
and also to discover rare events of interest (Marseguerra et al. 1994, 1995; Pedroni et al., 
2010; Zio and Pedroni 2009, 2010, 2011; Zio et al., 2010).Resorting to advanced Monte Carlo 
simulation (Zio, 2013) is necessary for the estimation of the (very low) probabilities of 
the(rare) failureevents of interest, since a crude Monte Carlo would require a very large 
number of runsof the BE code of the TH model, with prohibitive computational times in 
practice. Still, the computational times could remain impractical even when resortingto 
advanced Monte Carlo simulation methods, if the BE code were required to be more 
accurate and detailed: in this case, meta-modelling could be the only viable solution.Meta-
models are compact scalable models that approximate the multivariate input/output 
behaviour of complex systems and processes, based on data from a limited set of 
experimental observations or computationally expensive simulations. Their use is constantly 
increasing for parametric studies, design and scenario space exploration, uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis, optimization. They are also called surrogate models, response surface 
models (RSM), emulators, auxiliary models, repro-models, etc. Interestingly, recently 
effective strategies for further reducing computational efforts of complex systems scenarios 
evaluations have been proposed, which combine Monte Carlo-based methods with meta-
modelling (Echard et al., 2011; Bourimet et al., 2011; Doubourg et al, 2013; Echard et al., 
2013; Cadini et al., 2014). 
At the back-hand of the IDPSA analysis, the challenge is to be able to handle and manipulate the 
massive amount of scenario data generated in a transparent post-processing capable of allowing the 
assimilation of the contained information by PSA and DSA. In particular within a Monte Carlo 
simulation framework for IDPSA, the information on the evolution of the system is hidden in the 
system life histories that are simulated as part of the computational procedure. Among these 
histories, there are sequences that reproduce qualitatively similar behaviours in terms of the 
evolution of the physical parameters and of the sequences of events of state transition, mainly 
differing for the times at which these latter occur. Other sequences may instead differ in behaviour, 
because characterized by different combinations of occurred events, and still reach the same final 
outcome state. The difficulty in identifying and grouping similar scenarios lies in the fact that same 
event sequences may correspond to rather different process parameters evolutions and, possibly, 
end states, depending on the events timing or on their occurrence order. Then, grouping the 
scenarios only on the basis of the occurred events and end states may not be sufficient and 
accountancy of the physical behaviour of the process variables should also be included.In this 
respect, a number of methods are being proposed, based on clustering of the scenario data (Figure 2) 
(Podofillini et al., 2008; Zio and Di Maio, 2009; Mandelli et al., 2010; Di Maio et al., 2011). 
 
 Figure 2: Conceptual scheme of IDPSA scenario post-processing for a case of multiple failure modes 
(low-temperature and high-temperature failure modes): scenario classification by fuzzy clustering 
based on the values of the characteristic variables of the stochastic events and deterministic process 
(Zio and Di Maio, 2011). 
The underlying idea of these approachesis to group the IDPSA-generated scenarios in classes of 
“similarity”, by combining information from both the event sequences and the patterns of evolution 
of the process variables.In all generality, this leads to a task of pattern classification, i.e. the 
partitioning of objects into classes. In particular,a classification algorithm can be built through a 
process of learning based on a set of patterns labelledwith the class they belong to: this kind of 
techniques is termed “supervised” and the available pre-classified data are termed “training” data. 
For IDPSA post-processing purposes, the first step is the a priori identification of the anticipated 
scenario classes for the system under analysis and of the relevant classification features. The 
scenarios will eventually be classified as belonging to a particular class based on the affinity of their 
features to those characteristic of the class. Scenario classes should distinguish different reference 
scenarios that the system is expected to follow in its evolution. They must be defined a priori on the 
basis of available knowledge on the system operation. For example, classes of scenarios may be 1) 
the nominal operative scenarios; 2) scenarios involving the non-automatic startup of the High 
Pressure Injection (HPI) system; 3) scenarios involving both the non-automatic startup of HPI and the 
failure of a Turbine Bypass Valve (TBV). The identification of the features relevant to the classification 
is necessary to condense the scenario description into an object vector x, i.e. the pattern to be fed to 
the classification function. The features can be either binary or continuous variables. Binary variables 
characterize the scenarios based on the occurrence or not of certain events, for example the 
intervention or failure of a safety system; continuous variables characterize the scenario based on 
the evolution of the process variables. 
The successive steps of the procedure are typical of a supervised classification scheme: training of 
the classifier on patterns of known classes and test of the classifier on new patterns. 
Once the IDPSA scenarios are classified properly, the probability of each class can be estimated and 
the dominant evolutionary patterns identified, in terms of both failure events sequences and process 
variables evolutions. 
An important asset sought from thesepost-processing techniques is related to the capability of 
recognizing unanticipated scenarios, i.e. patterns of evolution that were not foreseen as reference in 
the a priori analysis and thus do not fall in any scenario class. The identification of new, unforeseen 
evolutionary patterns completes the analyst knowledge on the system with information on 
unexpected failure scenarios, i.e. undiscovered plant vulnerabilities, and may aid to suggest 
additional and more effective safety-oriented improvements of the system. 
Finally, a fundamental issue for allowing the use of IDPSA in industrial practice is an improvement in 
the usability of IDPSA codes by non-developers: user-friendly graphical interfaces for the 
development of the input structure and for the post-processing of the output results are needed, 
accompanied by proper training for use. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The strive for very low risk levels in highly hazardous technologies like nuclear, oil and gas, 
aerospace, etc.is challenging the state-of-the-art safety analyses (PSA / DSA)due to the increase use 
of passive safety systems in new plants and retrofits in existing plants, the introduction of I&C, the 
need to consider the role of the human operators in the scenarios development, the implementation 
of severe accident management in plant design. These newly added ingredients significantly 
complicate the analysis and introduce additional uncertainties, thus rendering difficult a solid “a 
priori” judgment about conservatism in the selected DSA and PSA scenarios. 
IDPSA is considered to be the way to go to complement PSA/DSA in response to these challenges. 
Overcoming of the limitations of PSA/DSA is achieved by the use of both in their respective 
applicability domains, via an integration which leads to a more complete exploration of the scenario 
space and coverage of undesired events, with the consistent treatment of the different sources of 
uncertainty involved in the analysis, both aleatory and epistemic. 
IDPSA provides a framework for analysing and simulating directly the response of a system to an 
initial perturbation, as the system hardware and software components and the operating crew 
interact with each other and with the environment. This can be achieved by embedding models of 
controlled process dynamics and human operator behaviour within stochastic simulation engines 
reproducing the occurrence of failure and success transitions along the scenarios.  
This way of system modelling goes beyond the classical approach to PSA which relies on techniques, 
such as ET/FT, to represent the analyst understanding of the system logic with respect to its failure 
mechanisms. Such classical approach to system analysis requires significant pre-processing efforts for 
the analyst to acquire the detailed knowledge of the integral system logic and dynamics necessary to 
structure the accidental scenarios into the proper discrete logic frame. In some situations this way of 
approaching the problem fails to capture and reproduce salient features of the system behaviour. A 
typical case is when differences in the sequence order of the same success and failure events along 
an accident scenario affect its outcome. Another case is when the timing of occurrence of the events 
along the scenario substantially affects its evolution and possibly its outcome. Finally, modellingand 
analysis difficulties are encountered when the evolution of the process variables (temperatures, 
pressures, mass flows, etc …) affects the occurrence probabilities of the events and, thus, the 
subsequent scenario evolution. 
To cope with these issues, IDPSA methodologies attempt to integrate dynamic and stochastic 
processes to capture the integrated dynamic response of the system hardware and process, the 
control and operator actions, the software and firmware, during an accident scenario. In this 
framework, the analyst is somewhat relieved from the pre-processing task of identifying the accident 
scenarios, which are instead automatically generated within the dynamic simulation.  
On the other hand, by this way the number of scenarios that are analysed is much larger than that of 
the classical ET/FT logic approaches, so that not only the computational burden is increased but also 
the a posteriori information retrieval and interpretation becomes more difficult.  
On the other hand, the IDPSA approach brings several potential advantages. First, there is the 
possible identification of accident scenarios which may have been overlooked by the analyst in the 
pre-processing phase. Second, conservative simplifying assumptions made by the analyst, for 
example on the evolution of some process parameters, can be relaxed as the process evolution is 
simulated directly by the underlying dynamic model. Finally, additional informative insights are 
gained from the analysis, in the form of time-dependent joint probability density functions of 
components states and process parameters values. In this respect, again, the amount of information 
retrievable from IPDSA analyses, in terms of number of scenarios and probability distributions, can 
be overwhelming and generally calls for a significant effort in the post-processing phase. Yet, 
retrieving the dominant scenarios of the system dynamic evolution can provide significant safety and 
risk-informed insights on the criticality of the scenarios and on the efficiencies of the protections 
designed to counteract them.  
In this sense, IDPSA can contribute significantly torobust risk-informed decision making in safety, by 
allowing for both probabilistic and deterministic considerations in the analysis of the mutual, time-
dependent interactions of the stochastic process of hardware component failures, the deterministic 
response of the system process, the effects of the control and operator actions, software and 
firmware. 
Methods are continuously being developed and improved, with the aim to bring IDPSA to industrial 
practice. This entails: 
 Computational efficiency for the generation of the multiple scenarios of interest (the failure 
ones), by both efficient stochastic (by advanced Monte Carlo) and deterministic (by advanced 
meta-modelling) simulations. 
 Efficient and transparent post-processing (by clustering and data mining) of the analysis 
output, to render it usable. 
 User-friendliness of the IDPSA code in the input and at the output, and flexibility of the 
computational platform for allowing the link with existing PSA/DSA codes. 
 References 
Acosta, C., Siu, N., 1993. Dynamic event trees in accident sequence analysis: application to steam 
generator tube rupture. Reliability Engineering and SystemSafety 41, 135–154. 
Aldemir, T., 1989. Quantifying setpoint drift effects in the failure analysis of processcontrol systems. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 24, 33–50. 
Aldemir, T., 2013. A survey of dynamic methodologies for probabilistic safety assessmentof nuclear 
power plants, Annals of Nuclear Energy 52, 113–124. 
Amendola, A., Reina, G., 1984. DYLAM-1, A Software Package for Event Sequenceand Consequence 
Spectrum Methodology. EUR-924, CEC-JRC ISPRA,Commission of the European Communities, Ispra, 
Italy. 
J.-M. Bourinet, F. Deheeger, M. Lemaire, “Assessing small failure probabilities by combined subset 
simulation and Support Vector Machines”. Structural Safety  2011; 33: 343-353 
Cacciabue, P.C., Amendola, A., Cojazzi, G., 1986. Dynamic logical analyticalmethodology versus fault 
tree: the case of auxiliary feedwater system of anuclear power plant. Nuclear Technology 74, 195–
208. 
Catalyurek, U., Rutt, B., Metzroth, K., Hakobyan, A., Aldemir, T., Denning, R.S.,Dunagan, S., Kunsman, 
D., 2010. Development of a code-agnostic computationalinfrastructure for the dynamic generation of 
accident progressionevent trees.Reliability Engineering and System Safety 95, 278–304. 
Cepin, M., Mavko, B., 2001. A dynamic fault-tree. Reliability Engineering and SystemSafety 75, 83–91. 
Cojazzi, G., 1996. The DYLAM approach to the dynamic reliability analysis ofsystems. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 52, 279–296. 
Deoss, D., Siu, N., 1989. A Simulation Model for Dynamic System AvailabilityAnalysis. M.S. Thesis, MIT 
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Boston,Massachusetts. 
Devooght, J., Smidts, C., 1992a. Probabilistic reactor dynamics I: the theory ofcontinuous event trees. 
Nuclear Science and Engineering 111, 229–240. 
Devooght, J., Smidts, C., 1992b. Probabilistic reactor dynamics – III: a framework fortime dependent 
interaction between operator and reactor during a transientinvolving human error. Nuclear Science 
and Engineering 112, 101–113. 
F. Cadini, F. Santos, E. Zio, “An improved adaptive Kriging-based importance sampling for sampling 
multiple failure regions of low probability”. Under revision. 2014. 
F. Di Maio, P. Secchi, S. Vantini, E. Zio, “Fuzzy C-Means Clustering of Signal Functional Principal 
Components for Post-Processing Dynamic Scenarios of a Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation 
and Control System”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, Volume 60, no. 2, pp. 415-425, June 2011. 
V. Dubourg, B. Sudret, F.  Deheeger, “Metamodel-based importance sampling for structural reliability 
analysis”. Probabilistic Engineering Mechanics 2013; 33: 47-57. 
Dutuit, Y., Chatelet, E., Signoret, J.-P., Thomas, P., 1997. Dependability modeling andevaluation by 
using stochastic Petri nets: application to two test cases.Reliability Engineering and System Safety 55, 
117–124. 
B. Echard, N. Gayton, M. Lemaire, “AK-MCS: An active learning reliability method combining Kriging 
and Monte Carlo Simulation”. Structural Safety 2011; 33:145-154. 
B. Echard, N. Gayton, M. Lemaire, N. Relun, “A combined Importance Sampling and Kriging reliability 
method for small failure probabilities with time-demanding numerical methods”. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 2013; 111:232-240. 
Gribaudo, M., Horvaacute, A., Bobbio, A., Tronci, E., Ciancamerla, E., Minichino, M., 2006. Fluid Petri 
nets and hybrid model-checking: a comparative case study.Reliability Engineering and System Safety 
81, 239–257. 
Guarro, S., Yau, M., Motamed, M., 1996. Development of Tools for safety Analysis ofControl Software 
in Advanced Reactors. NUREG/CR-6465, US NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC. 
Hassan, M., Aldemir, T., 1990. A data base oriented dynamic methodology for thefailure analysis of 
closed loop control systems in process plants. ReliabilityEngineering and System Safety 27, 275–322. 
Hofer, E., Kloos, M., Krzykacz-Hausmann, B., Peschke, J., Woltereck, M., 2002. Anapproximate 
epistemic uncertainty analysis approach in the presence ofepistemic and aleatory uncertainties. 
Reliability Engineering and SystemSafety 77, 229–238. 
Hofer, E., Kloos, M., Krzykacz-Hausmann, B., Peschke, J., Sonnenkalb, M., 2004.Dynamic Event Trees 
for Probabilistic Safety Analysis. GRS, Garsching,Germany. 
Izquerdo, J.M., Hortal, J., Sanches-Perea, J., Melendez, E., 1994. Automatic generationof dynamic 
event trees: a tool for integrated safety assessment. In: Aldemir, T.,Siu, N., Mosleh, A., Cacciabue, 
P.C., Goktepe, B.G. (Eds.), Reliability and SafetyAssessment of Dynamic Process Systems, NATO ASI 
Series F, vol. 120. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 135–150. 
Kae-Sheng, H., Mosleh, A., 1996. The development and application of the accidentdynamic simulator 
for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear powerplants. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 52, 297–314. 
Kirschenbaum, J., Bucci, P., Stovsky, M., Mandelli, D., Aldemir, T., Yau, M., Guarro, S., Ekici, E., Arndt, 
S.A., 2009. A benchmark system for comparing reliabilitymodeling approaches for digital 
instrumentation and control systems. NuclearTechnology 165, 53–95. 
Labeau, P.E., Izquierdo, J.M., 2005. Modeling PSA problems – I: the stimulus-driventheory of 
probabilistic dynamics. Nuclear Science and Engineering 150, 115–139. 
Mandelli, D., Aldemir, T., Yilmaz, A., 2010a. Scenario aggregation in dynamic PRAuncertainty 
quantification. Transactions of the American Nuclear Society 103,371–374. 
Mandelli, D., Metzroth, K., Yilmaz, A., Denning, R.S., Aldemir, T., 2010b. Probabilistic clustering for 
scenario analysis. Transactions of the American Nuclear Society103, 371–374. 
Marchand, S., Tombuyes, B., Labeau, P., 1998. DDET and Monte Carlo simulation tosolve some 
dynamic reliability problems. In: Mosleh, A., Bari, R. (Eds.), PSAM 4.Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 
2055–2060. 
M. Marseguerra, M. Nutini, E. Zio: Approximate Physical Modelling in Dynamic PSA Using Artificial 
Neural Networks, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 45, pp. 47 - 56, 1994. 
 M. Marseguerra, E. Zio, The Cell-To-Boundary Method in Monte Carlo-Based Dynamic PSA, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, vol. 48, pp.199-204, 1995. 
M. Marseguerra, M. Ricotti, E. Zio, Approaching System Evolution in Dynamic PSA by Neural 
Networks", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 49, pp. 91-99, 1995. 
M. Marseguerra and E. Zio, Weight Updating In Forced Monte Carlo Approach To Dynamic PSA, 
Monte Carlo Methods, 4, N 4, 1998, pp. 359-374. 
Matsuoka, T., Kobayashi, M., 1988. GO-FLOW: a new reliability analysismethodology. Nuclear Science 
and Engineering 98, 64–78. 
Matsuoka, T., Kobayashi, M., 1991. An analysis of a dynamic system by the GOFLOWmethodology. In: 
Cacciabue, P.C., Papazoglou, I.A. (Eds.), ProbabilisiticSafety Assessment and Management. Elsevier, 
New York, pp. 1436–1547. 
NUREG/CR-6465, 1996. Development of Tools for Safety Analysis ofControl Software in Advanced 
Reactors. US NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington, DC. 
NUREG/CR-6710, 2001. Extending the Dynamic FlowgraphMethodology (DFM) to Model Human 
Performance and Team Effects., US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. 
NUREG/CR-6901, 2006.Current State of ReliabilityModeling Methodologies forDigital Systems and 
TheirAcceptance Criteria forNuclear Power Plant AssessmentsUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC. 
NUREG/CR-6942, 2007. Dynamic Reliability Modeling of Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems 
for Nuclear Reactor Probabilistic Risk AssessmentsUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC. 
NUREG/CR-6985, 2009. A Benchmark Implementation ofTwo Dynamic Methodologies forthe 
Reliability Modeling of DigitalInstrumentation and ControlSystemsUS Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC. 
N. Pedroni, E. Zio, G.E. Apostolakis, “Comparison of bootstrapped Artificial Neural Networks and 
quadratic Response Surfaces for the estimation of the functional failure probability of a thermal-
hydraulic passive system”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 95(4), pp. 386-395, 2010. 
Podofillini, L., Zio, E., Mercurio, D., Dang, V.N., 2008. Dynamic safety assessment:scenario 
identification via a fuzzy clustering approach. Accident Analysis andPrevention 41, 1180–1191. 
Quine W.V., The problem of simplifying truth functions, Am. Math. Monthly, Volume 59, 521-531, 
1952. 
Swaminathan, S., Smidts, C., 1999. The mathematical formulation of the eventsequence diagram 
framework. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 65,103–118. 
Tombuyes, B., Aldemir, T., 1996. Dynamic PSA of process control-systems viacontinuous cell-to-cell-
mapping. In: Cacciabue, P.C., Papazoglou, I.A. (Eds.), Probabilistic Safety Assessment and 
Management. Springer-Verlag, New York,pp. 1541–1546. 
Tombuyes, B., Aldemir, T., 1997. Continuous cell-to-cell mapping. Journal of Soundand Vibration 202, 
395–415. 
Voroyev, Y., Kudinov, P., 2011. Development and Application of a Genetic AlgorithmBased Dynamic 
PRA Methodology to Plant Vulnerability Search. PSA 2011,American Nuclear Society, LaGrange Park. 
Yau, M., 1997. Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology for the Analysis of Software BasedControlled 
Systems. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. 
Zamalieva, D., Yilmaz, A. and Aldemir, T., 2013. A probabilistic model for online scenario labeling in 
dynamic event tree generation, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Volume 120, December 
2013, Pages 18–26. 
E. Zio. The Monte Carlo Simulation Method for System Reliability and Risk Analysis. Springer, 2013. 
E. Zio: Biasing the Transition Probabilities  in Direct Monte Carlo, Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, vol. 47, pp.59-63, 1995. 
E. Zio, F. Di Maio, “A Data-Driven Fuzzy Approach for Predicting the Remaining Useful Life in Dynamic 
Failure Scenarios of a Nuclear Power Plant”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, RESS, 
10.1016/j.ress.2009.08.001, 2009. 
E. Zio, F. Di Maio, M. Stasi, “A data-driven approach for predicting failure scenarios in nuclear 
systems”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 37, 482–491, 2010 
E. Zio and N. Pedroni, "Estimation of the Functional Failure Probability of a Thermal-Hydraulic Passive 
System by Subset Simulation", Nuclear Engineering and Design, vol 239, No. 3, 2009, pp. 580-599. 
E. Zio and N. Pedroni, "Functional Failure Analysis of a Thermal-Hydraulic Passive System by Means of 
Line Sampling", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol 9, No. 11, pp. 1764-1781, 2009. 
E. Zio, N. Pedroni, "An optimized Line Sampling method for the estimation of the failure probability 
of nuclear passive systems", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, doi: 
10.1016/j.ress.2010.06.007. 
E. Zio, N. Pedroni, “How to effectively compute the reliability of a thermal-hydraulic passive system”, 
accepted for publication on Nuclear Engineering and Design, Volume 241, Issue 1, pp. 310-327, Jan. 
2011. 
E. Zio, N. Pedroni, M. Broggi, L. Golea, “Modelling the dynamics of the Lead Bismuth Eutectic 
eXperimental Accelerator Driven System by an Infinite Impulse Response Locally Recurrent Neural 
Network”, Nuclear Engineering and Technology, 41(10), pp. 1293-1306, 2009. 
E. Zio, F. Di Maio, “Processing Dynamic Scenarios from a Reliability Analysis of a Nuclear Power Plant 
Digital Instrumentation and Control System”, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 
doi:10.1016/j.anucene.2009.06.012, 2009. 
